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argument here will be that the conclusions drawn in the previous article continue to hold 
good, precisely because the paradigm shift I describe has followed a direction that is matched 
to the general principle that was articulated there as a necessary precursor to an ethics of the 
virtual: as the object changes, then so does the locus of the phenomenological investigation 
on which any ethical framework is to be founded. Equally, any contingent framework also 
proves to be fundamentally “sticky” – that is, it clings to a notion of adherence rather than to 
an assumption of inherence – which, I contend further, is a crucial feature of any truly ethical 
ethics. 
This notion of a “truly ethical ethics” is one that may strike the reader as somewhat 
redundant, in these terms at least, so it will require a brief word of elaboration. One question 
that should be asked of any ethical framework is whether or not it establishes in a priori 
fashion that a given entity, practice, or structure is inherently either ethical or unethical. The 
abiding premise on which this paper stands is that we do a disservice to people or things if we 
prescribe in closed off fashion, in advance, that they possess the singular quality of being 
either ethical or unethical. To put this in the most direct manner, we should insist only that 
actions or relations shall be described as ethical-unethical; people or things shall not. 
“Actions or relations” should be understood in this context as ephemeral phenomena, such as 
an act carried out by an individual agent or specific relationships between agents in the here-
and-now of the act of interrelating. When we talk of an “entity, practice, or structure,” on the 
other hand, we refer to an understanding that things pre-exist these ephemeral actions or 
relations and are seen as possibly pre-determining them. For example, an agent carries out an 
action so is viewed as being prior to and determining the action; this agent also uses a given 
method and possibly adheres to a set of pre-ordained rules. If we presume that any of these 
pre-existing people or things are inherently ethical, then we risk being unable to adequately 
assess each individual action as being either ethical or unethical on its own terms. The same 
should apply, I contend, to the ethical framework itself: it must not be presumed that “ethics” 
– the study of ethical conduct – is itself inherently ethical; rather it must be conducted 
ethically in each instantiation. When, under the aegis of “ethics,” I study what another person 
does, my conduct must also be ethical inasmuch as it is responsible to this Other in the very 
specificity of his or her Otherness from me. Reducing the Other to the quality of being 
inherently ethical or unethical denies the Other this specificity, and is therefore not an ethical 
way to conduct my study of what this other person does.  
The point is made here not by way of any attempt to single out the ethical frameworks of 
other theorists as failing this test. Rather, this notion of an “ethical ethics” is being used here 
because this paper seeks to demonstrate that the terms around which discussions of the ethics 
of CMC have revolved invariably present the participants with a situation in which they will 
automatically fail this test of inherency. CMC has, by definition, been viewed in these 
discussions as the opposite of face-to-face (FTF) communication and, as such, as not 
including any direct encounter with the face of another person. Accordingly, CMC has 
invariably been regarded as a practice in which ethics cannot inhere, devoid as it is of the 
encounter with the “face” – Levinas, for one, being very clear about the pre-ordinance of this 
encounter as the basis for an ethical relation with the Other. Yet it is difficult to be 
programmatic about the Levinasian face since, as I have argued elsewhere, the concept of 
“face” was never programmatically defined by Levinas; rather, it was presented in different 
ways in different contexts, but always ultimately in so far as it could be used to explain the 
fundamental and necessary “alterity” of the Other: 
The otherness of the Other is always an otherness within a relation between 
two. This fundamental principle, once established, becomes the conceptual 
grounding on which Levinas builds the whole of his ethical framework. 
Alterity is nothing more nor less than what conjoins me to the Other as a 
responsible being, since it is the presence of the Other as another and the 
necessary recognition that I am therefore one in a relation with one other that 
allows me to come into knowledge of myself. Thus, I am wholly responsible 
to the Other for my being. (Johnson 51-52)  
The “face” of the Other was not always in Levinas’s work the flesh and blood visage of a 
human interlocutor – though it became synonymous with a human face with ever greater 
insistence when he sought in later works to abstract the ethical relation via the notion of 
“proximity,” for example – and at various times it served more generally as a term to describe 
any aspect of the relation to the Other through which “I” am brought forth into language. In 
other words, the face is more generally that to which I respond when I am enjoined to do so 
in order to come into knowledge of myself. Using the Levinasian framework as a starting 
point, then, we must ground all thinking of the virtual within the phenomenal. This is to say 
that we establish a need for a phenomenological approach to CMC “rather than treating the 
computer as an incidental component in the recession of the human interlocutors from one 
another” (Johnson 52).  
The task of the present paper is to examine whether the phenomenological imperative for 
which I have argued elsewhere is by its nature going to run up hard against established 
epistemological frameworks in CMC studies. The notion of an ethical ethics on which the 
present paper is grounded helps us to pinpoint the problem with this established approach to 
CMC, since dismissal of the potential for CMC to enable ethical relations between two 
people is based on the a priori distinction between CMC and FTF: they are seen as being 
inherently different. The possibility of an ethical encounter in CMC is thus closed off in 
advance. Yet it could also be argued that attempts to counter this presumption by insisting 
that there is a “face” present in CMC, run the risk of similarly failing the test of presumed 
inherency precisely because they rely on a negation of terms, taking as true that which is held 
to be false in the opposing argument. Our goal must therefore not be to argue simply that 
CMC is an inherently ethical space by virtue of possessing the thing that Levinas argues is at 
the core of the ethical encounter. Instead, we should be seeking to study each instance of use 
of CMC as a field of interlocution, with a view to finding whether or not it meets a number of 
prerequisite conditions for ethical conduct. We look, that is, to whether or not each instance 
of the use of CMC adheres to a set of broadly defined ethical principles. If the lack of the 
“face” has been problematic in the attempt to identify CMC as an ethical space, it is because 
we have for so long simply assumed in the field of CMC studies that there is no “face” in 
CMC. Our sense of the ethical possibilities for CMC have thus become fundamentally 
“stuck” in a principle of inherency, whereas an ethical ethics of CMC will seek only to be 
“sticky” – looking to adherence anew in each instantiation – rather than stuck. This, then, is 
our challenge here: to demonstrate that within CMC studies in recent years, we are 
witnessing a paradigm shift that will enable us to develop a suitably “sticky” ethics of CMC.  
Evidence of the traditional distinction in CMC studies can be found by undertaking even the 
most cursory inspection of the literature. In the 1970s and 1980s, a suite of models were 
developed by communication researchers to explain the behaviour of users of CMC. Social 
presence theory (Short, Williams and Christie), information richness theory (Daft and 
Lengel), and reduced social/context cues theory (Siegel, Dubrovsky, Kiesler and McGuire), 
for example, contributed each in their own way to explaining how interpersonal 
communication via computer directly differed from FTF communication, invariably with the 
example of CMC – email, ICQ relay chat, MOO or MUD, and so on – seen as lacking in 
comparison with what communication studies had been telling us for years about FTF 
communication. For this reason, these earliest theoretical responses to CMC within 
communications research are known collectively as the deficit approaches to CMC, which 
according to Crispin Thurlow, Laura Lengel and Alice Tomic usually characterise CMC as 
“impoverished, impersonal, ineffectual and emotionally cold” (47). The deficit approach was 
relaxed by a number of models developed in the 1990s in the wake of the work of Janet Fulk, 
Charles W. Steinfeld, Joseph Schmitz, and J. Gerard Power in 1987 on social information 
processing theory, which holds that the patterns of use adopted in CMC are directly 
influenced by social contexts such as the role played by “significant others in an individual’s 
social field” (Zack and McKenney 253). The point of social information processing theory is 
that users of CMC in structured networks such as an organisational communication setting 
tend to shape their communications online according to the same structural rules they apply 
offline: an email to a superior will be as deferential as would be the speech of the individual 
in any FTF meeting with the same person, for example. The theory was expanded from the 
organisational domain to more general interpersonal relationships in 1992 by Joseph Walther, 
whose “relational perspective” drew from a longitudinal analysis of CMC use to demonstrate 
that the “negative relational effects” on which earlier CMC research focused was in fact 
“confined to narrow situational boundary conditions,” whereas long-term interlocutors 
exhibited positive relational behaviour by developing individuated impressions through 
verbal or textual cues accumulated across a number of CMC interactions (“Interpersonal” 
52).  
In the early 1990s, Martin Lea and Russell Spears were also overturning the deficit approach 
to CMC through a re-examination of “de-individuation,” a concept that had in previous 
research been associated negatively with disinhibition but in their view was linked instead to 
social and normative factors associated with group polarisation (283). In the years that 
followed, Walther, Lea and Spears, and many others following their lead, generated research 
in support of the contention that CMC was actually superior in many ways to FTF rather than 
being in deficit by comparison with it. In 1996, Walther expanded the relational perspective 
into a fully formed model of “hyperpersonal interaction” recognising that in CMC the user 
has increased ability to shape or conceal aspects of self-presentation in comparison with FTF 
communication. Lea and Spears were more circumspect with regards to ascribing either a 
positive or a negative value to this newfound superiority of CMC and focused instead simply 
on demonstrating the “hidden power” of CMC (“Panacea”), explaining boundary-formation 
in CMC (Postmes, Spears and Lea), or examining the “power of influence” exercised in 
virtual groups (Spears, Postmes, Lea, and Wolbert). If the earlier approaches to CMC can be 
characterised as inhering in a deficit approach, I think it is fair to say that the newer wave of 
studies undertaken in the 1990s contributed collectively to what we may call a surplus 
approach, in which suspicion or even panic about CMC gave way to newfound optimism or 
at least open-mindedness with respect to its potential rather than its limitations. From a 
generation of deficit approaches to a second generation of surplus approaches, then, it seems 
that there was a fundamental revolution in CMC studies during the 1990s and beyond. 
Yet both approaches are grounded in a shared premise: regardless of whether one sees CMC 
as inferior or superior to FTF communication, both hold true to the fundamental belief in the 
difference in kind between the two types of communication. A comment like this may indeed 
seem so banal as to barely warrant mentioning: surely this is like saying that astronomers and 
astrologers, while disagreeing over the interpretive value of stellar bodies, nevertheless both 
hold true to the belief in the existence of stars. My contention would be that such an 
observation about CMC research is not as banal as this example suggests. Rather than 
disagreement between two explanatory models in relation to the observed properties of the 
same object, as is the case with the example of astronomers and astrologers, the disagreement 
between the deficit and the surplus approaches in CMC research amounts to that over the 
comparative value of properties possessed by objects belonging to two mutually exclusive 
classes of objects. Needless to say, this is a logical fallacy: the class of objects identified as 
CMC excludes direct interlocutory modes of communication (there is no face to whom one 
speaks directly), just as the latter excludes the former (there is no computer to mediate 
between the two speakers in face-to-face interlocution); there are, therefore, no properties that 
could be said to be common to the objects of both classes; so the attribution of relative value 
is never based on direct comparison of common properties. A counterargument could be 
mounted on the basis that surely both are in fact subsets of the class of communicative 
practices, so the objects in both share a property of being forms of communication and 
comparison can be made on the basis of how each performs the functions of any act of 
communication. This would be – or, indeed, should be – true of how a comparison of CMC 
with non-CMC or of FTF with non-FTF modes of communication may proceed directly. Yet 
in the terms with which I have just now spelled out these classifications, we see precisely 
why the observation above is not entirely banal: the premise shared by proponents of either 
the deficit or surplus approaches to CMC is faulty on the basis that it presumes there are only 
two types of communication on which to base relative value claims.  
This idea that there is only either CMC or FTF communication seems entrenched in the 
literature, and is characterised by a trope of direct competition between the two. The use of 
the word “versus” has become something of a commonplace in studies of CMC from both the 
deficit and surplus camps, used often in the titles of articles and, in the last decade, appearing 
with ever more increasing frequency as a statement of the scope of the research. Starr 
Roxanne Hiltz, Kenneth Johnson and Murray Turoff’s 1986 article, “Experiments in Group 
Decision Making Communication Process and Outcome in Face-to-Face Versus 
Computerized Conferences” is an example from the early deficit approaches, while Andrea 
Hollingshead, Joseph McGrath and Kathleen O’Connor’s contribution from 1993, “Group 
Task Performance and Communication Technology: A Longitudinal Study of Computer 
Mediated Versus Face-to-Face Work Groups,” is an example from the transitional period 
during which the surplus models prompted by the work of Walther and Lean and Spears were 
gaining acceptance. The trope of direct competition acquired significant leverage in 1997 
with the publication of Prashant Bordia’s “Face-to-Face Versus Computer-Mediated 
Communication: A Synthesis of the Experimental Literature” in the Journal of Business 
Communication. Bordia’s article has subsequently been heavily cited, as it provides an 
accessible and brief account of the major work being done in CMC studies up to that point. 
Of even more importance than its value as a survey of past literature, though, is the idea that 
Bordia’s decision to use the trope of direct competition to represent this literature was a key 
factor in delaying the paradigm shift that we are chiefly concerned with here. I will explain 
this observation shortly. Suffice to note here that since 1997, the phrase “face-to-face versus 
computer-mediated” has proliferated in CMC research articles as a statement of the scope of 
the research. It is as if the phrase has become synonymous with the entire field qua Bordia’s 
synthesis of the past literature. Recent examples of titles spanning the past decade bear this 
out: “An Experimental Analysis of Face to Face Versus Computer Mediated Communication 
Channels” in 1999 (Barkhi, Jacob and Pirkul); “Communication Patterns in Computer 
Mediated Versus Face-to-Face Group Problem Solving” in 2001 (Jonassen and Kwon Il); and 
“Face-to-Face Versus Computer-Mediated Communication in a Primary Setting” in 2005 
(van der Meijden and Veenman) – these are but three examples from very different 
perspectives on the field, all relying on the same trope to locate their specific focus within a 
broader map of CMC versus FTF communication. 
The effect of this trope of direct competition is thus to lock in a paradigm: the two are 
different – indeed, they are mutually exclusive – but are also inverse elements of each other. 
The properties of objects in each class also include, that is, the direct inverse or negative of 
the properties of objects in the other, the result being not just two mutually exclusive classes 
but a dichotomy with perfect inverse complementarity. New studies in CMC in the past 
decade have therefore been confronted immediately with a need to stake their claims on 
either of two opposing terms, where nary the twain shall meet. It is not hard to establish in 
logical terms why this is a false dichotomy, since it relies on two discrete inverse elements to 
establish difference between two sets of terms: one is mediated and the other is unmediated 
and one assumes the presence of the face while the other assumes the presence of a computer. 
It could be argued that these are very much dependent elements, since it is the presence of a 
computer that introduces the element of mediation; thus, remove the computer and you 
remove the mediation. Yet I maintain that the two elements are discrete, because it is possible 
to think of examples of at least the two other available classes of objects in which only one of 
the elements is inverted: unmediated communication involving a computer would be any 
practice wherein a simple human-computer interaction is involved, without a second human 
interlocutor (automated telephone operators, game command screens, and so on); and face-to-
face mediated communication, where mediation refers to the conveyance of data rather than 
dispute resolution for the sake of equivalence here, could involve the use of a messenger, the 
use of an interpreter or even cross-cultural communication more generally. The classes 
excluded by the trope of direct competition can in this way be shown to be of sufficient scale 
as to warrant attention, but the fact remains that invariably where the objects identified here 
are included in the research, the elements are inverted only in accordance with the trope. 
Thus, automated telephone operators or games are treated as examples of CMC, even where 
the communicative act is not designed to include a second human interlocutor.  
The shared premise to which I referred above comes down to this fundamental error in logic, 
then: it conflates two discrete elements (computer + mediation) into a single term and 
opposes it as the inverse to another term comprising the conflation of two discrete elements 
(face + unmediated viz “to-face”). In new research being undertaken in CMC studies, though, 
I think it is possible to see that the terms in which this error is expressed, and the trope of 
direct competition through which the error has become compounded, are undergoing 
significant review, albeit as an implicit effect rather than as an explicit intention of the 
research in question. The change has come about due to the fact that researchers have become 
increasingly interested in the role played by the face – or at least a graphical representation of 
a human face – in CMC. Before looking at some of these studies and the nature of the 
paradigm shift that I think is underway, we should note that the long standing dichotomy on 
which the previous paradigm was grounded hinged persistently on the idea that 
communication via computer was not a graphical environment. From Bordia’s influential 
publication of 1997, we find this as one of the initial explanations of the distinction between 
the two modes: 
Unlike FTF or audio communication, the medium in CMC is primarily textual. 
There are no nonverbal cues to embellish meaning or social context cues 
regarding gender, age, or status. Not only can the absence of cues hamper 
communication efficiency, but it seems to create a semblance of anonymity 
and lack of awareness of the social context. (100) 
Recall once again that this item was published in 1997, and note also that the eighteen studies 
that Bordia synthesises date from the period 1985 to 1994. Along these lines, it is also worth 
noting that graphical user interfaces (GUI) were already cornering the domestic personal 
computer (PC) market by around the date of the earliest publication covered by Bordia: 
following the initial commercial trials of a GUI interface in the Xerox Star 8010 in 1981 
(Norman 316), Apple launched the relatively unsuccessful Apple Lisa in 1983 (later rebadged 
as the Macintosh XL) and then the very successful Apple Macintosh – which was launched 
via “a dramatic Orwellian commercial during the Superbowl football game in January 1984” 
(Allan 10/22) – and IBM followed suit with the development of TopView in 1984, which was 
overtaken in the PC world by  Microsoft’s  now ubiquitous Windows, released in 1985 (Allan 
12/18-19).  
The point of this brief history of the early emergence of GUI technology is that a key basis 
for the distinction between CMC and FTF circa 1985 to 1994 and as articulated in a highly 
influential article in 1997 is that “CMC is primarily textual” when in fact a GUI revolution 
had already radically altered the computing landscape by the start of the period during which 
these studies were being conducted. From 1985 onwards, the PC and, with it, the vast 
majority of communicative practices covered under the rubric of CMC acquired at least some 
graphical component. Yet the earlier studies from the period covered by Bordia could be 
excused for not conceiving of CMC as graphical at least on the basis that their focus was 
principally on human-to-human communication which, for the most part, could be covered 
under email and instant messaging, both of which had long predated the advent of graphical 
interfaces. Space precludes detailed discussion of the development of GUI components in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s, but I hope the reader with even a vague sense of the history of 
computer games or the internet will appreciate the observation that we have for considerably 
longer than the last decade been witnessing the emergence of a range of primarily graphical 
interfaces for both human-computer interaction and human-to-human interaction via 
computer. While email and instant messaging, for example, may remain “primarily textual” it 
is fair to say that these tools have long since ceased to uniquely characterise the range of 
objects included in the class of CMC. Furthermore, even within any tool that could be 
described as primarily textual, GUI components such as emoticons, animations, and graphical 
avatars have become increasingly common. Thus, even in those pockets of CMC that remain 
primarily textual, Bordia’s summary of the medium as having “no nonverbal cues to 
embellish meaning or social context cues regarding gender, age, or status” has long been 
under siege by the technology itself. 
For all this, however, we have noted the persistence of the trope of direct competition, 
perhaps in no small part due to Bordia’s own summary of the field at a time when the 
technology already seemed to have exceeded the terms of the distinction. Researchers did in 
fact become interested in the role of graphical components of CMC in the late 1990s, but the 
studies along these lines that I have encountered from that era seem to reproduce the trope of 
direct competition even as they concern themselves with issues of the representation of a face 
or any other graphical representation of an interlocutor within CMC. For example, John 
Bowers, James Pycock and Jon O’Brien presented a paper to the conference of the Special 
Interest Group on Computer-Human Interaction in 1996 in which they analysed social 
interaction in collaborative virtual environments (CVE) and found inter alia “systematic 
problems with turn taking and participation in such environments” and proposed technical 
developments “to enhance interactivity in virtual worlds” (58). Thus, properties attributed to 
FTF interactions for collaborative purposes (turn taking and participation) are given a 
positive value and where the CVE environment diverges it is seen as problematic. The 
technology is seen as needing to be enhanced in order to bring it closer to these positive 
attributes. While less inclined to attribute positive values to either mode, Anne Lantz in her 
2001 article, “Meetings in a Distributed Group of Experts: Comparing Face-to-Face, Chat, 
and Collaborative Virtual Environments,” explicitly concerns herself with “the difference 
between face-to-face, chat, and CVE meetings,” which is duly borne out by the data (111). 
One of the most significant figures in the emergence of the surplus approach, Joseph Walther, 
also engaged with the graphical components of CMC in 2001, in “Is a Picture Worth a 
Thousand Words? Photographic Images in Long-Term and Short-Term Computer-Mediated 
Communication,” an article written with Celeste Slovacek and Lisa Tidwell. While they are 
intent on examining “the interplay of media properties as they interact with other, social 
variables,” the trio nevertheless express their research problem in a form that by now looks 
deeply familiar:  
In other words, when, if ever, does the presentation of communicators’ 
photographs help or hinder their communication in online conferencing, 
compared to the impressions and relations that are built solely on the basis of 
text-based communication? Which is better, a picture or a thousand words? 
(106)   
Phrases such as “help or hinder,” “compared to,” and the blunt “which is better” are of course 
exemplary of the trope of direct competition. 
At a time when CMC studies seemed to want to collapse or at least reconsider the old 
dichotomy, then, the trope of direct competition persisted for a number of years past what 
would have seemed to be its expiry date. Bordia’s publication was no doubt a key to this, but 
we cannot overlook the importance of the fact that the new research into the presentation of 
faces and bodies in CMC was in many cases undertaken by the same people who had been 
proponents of either the deficit or surplus approaches (such as Walther) or were students of 
the same people. Whereas the technology may seem to have been changing in the blink of an 
eye, academic careers are for life. The onus on researchers at the end of the last millennium 
seemed to be on coming to terms with the graphical components of CMC at least in the terms 
with which they had been familiar for over two decades. Alternatively, researchers who 
wanted to avoid dealing with graphical components became increasingly mindful of needing 
to specify that the focus of their work was limited only to “text-based” CMC (see, for 
example, Garrison, Anderson and Archer; Hancock and Dunham; Herring; Jacobson; Tu – all 
published within the 1999 to 2002 timeframe). It is only in the last few years, I suggest, that 
the paradigmatic dichotomy between CMC and FTF has begun to relinquish its hold on CMC 
studies. I will briefly outline a number of studies that seem to me to collectively signal the 
decline of the old paradigm. Sriram Kalyanaraman and James Ivory offer a small glimpse of 
this new order in a paper they presented at the annual meeting of the International 
Communication Association, 2006, “The Face of Online Information Processing: Effects of 
Emoticons on Impression Formation, Affect, and Cognition in Chat Transcripts.” Despite the 
seemingly innocuous nature of their topic, the authors correctly, in my opinion, claim that 
their “findings have several interesting theoretical implications and offer a promising 
direction for future CMC research” (6). Their work seeks to extend previous studies into 
emoticons which were “restricted to impression formation effects, examined emoticons as 
text-based symbols, or have been confined to e-mail conversations” and they offer instead a 
more “holistic” analysis of emoticons in chat rooms in terms of gender bias and topic context 
(1-2), resulting in “a nuanced understanding of the effects of emoticons” (6). Importantly, the 
authors retreat from any compulsion to draft comparisons with FTF communication, and they 
do note that the use of emoticons constitutes a “non-verbal cue” (1).  
Moving from emoticons to a more dynamic graphical representation of a face, Jeremy 
Bailenson, Nick Yee, Dan Merget, and Ralph Schroeder published a paper on “avatar 
realism” in the journal Presence in 2006, in which they compared levels of disclosure, 
emotional recognition and “copresence” in CVEs with three different levels of audio and 
graphic functionality. Importantly, from the perspective of this paper, the authors develop an 
explanatory model “for considering representations of humans that is not limited just to 
digital avatars” (360) for the purpose of enabling comparison between types of avatars 
ranging from a photograph to real-time virtual representations. In the same vein, Jun’ichiro 
Seyama and Ruth S. Nagayama produced a study in 2007 in the same journal dealing with 
“The Uncanny Valley: Effect of Realism on the Impression of Artificial Human Faces.” Their 
study was oriented toward a problem identified in the field of robotics, where it was 
previously believed that a human would develop an unpleasant impression of a humanoid 
robot with an almost perfect human appearance. Using a range of images from clearly non-
human (a doll, a basic computer graphic, or a cartoon) morphed by degrees toward a clearly 
human face, the authors tracked how viewers responded to each image, and found that the 
“uncanny valley” predicted by roboticists – “too high a degree of human realism evokes an 
unpleasant impression in the viewer” (337) – could only be confirmed where the image 
possessed an abnormal feature such as enlarged eyes. The authors recognise that their 
findings are “applicable to any type of human-like object, such as dolls, masks, facial 
caricatures, avatars in virtual reality, and characters in computer graphics movies” (337), and 
given the work done by Bailenson, Yee, Merget and Schroeder, the reach of these studies 
becomes significant. As the authors of the earlier paper noted, “both verbally and 
nonverbally, people disclosed more information to avatars that were lower in realism…. In 
other words, people emote more freely when their avatar does not express those emotions” 
(Bailenson, Yee, Merget, and Schroeder 368). The two studies provide fresh insight into the 
status of representations of human faces in terms of how the user responds to them, as 
fundamental components of both the human-computer interaction and the user-to-user 
interaction, where there is no attempt to assume any a priori distinction between these two 
kinds of interaction. 
Bailenson and Yee have continued working on avatars, and together with Nicholas 
Ducheneaut in 2009 published an article in Communication Research entitled “The Proteus 
Effect: Implications of Transformed Digital Self-Representation on Online and Offline 
Behavior” (Yee, Bailenson and Ducheneaut). Expanding on research that Bailenson and Yee 
had undertaken in 2007 on the role of avatar height on participant behaviour in virtual 
interactions, this study broadened the scope of the investigation to cover a range of avatar 
features in the context of the relationship between online and offline behaviour. While there 
remains a necessary functional differentiation between online and offline, this work is never 
drawn into demarcating any clear distinction, let alone constructing a scale of positive or 
negative values associated with either. From these examples of work involving Bailenson, 
Yee, and others in the last few years, we can see where the paradigm of difference and the 
trope of direct competition have begun to relinquish their hold on the field of CMC research. 
These recent studies are showing that it is possible to conceive of the role played by 
representations of faces in CMC without recourse to this paradigm. Freed from this paradigm, 
what do they tell us about the role of the face? Importantly, there is no clear delimitation of 
online and offline self-representation: there is always potential for leakage between the 
response of the user to online faces and bodies and the behaviour of the same user offline. 
This is not to overturn the old paradigm absolutely by insisting instead that there is no clear 
difference between online and offline behaviour or even of their status as phenomena – per 
the phenomenological imperative for which I argued in the Ethical Space paper – but it does 
render unworkable the categorical distinction between CMC and FTF as modes of 
communication. Rather than CMC versus FTF, we now see research that is prepared to 
consider self-presentation along a continuum of related behaviours. This same research is 
also always demanding that these related behaviours are examined in detail, rather than 
seeking to extrapolate from observed behaviour in one object to the entire class of objects. 
Can we form any conclusions, then, about the continuing validity of claims about the 
usefulness of a Levinasian framework for an ethical approach to CMC? If the field of CMC 
studies is already undergoing a paradigm shift that involves the dissolution of a distinction 
between CMC and FTF, and researchers are now prepared to consider the face in relation to 
presence and self-presentation in CMC, the Levinasian framework is no longer necessary in 
order to achieve the same goal. Yet the goal was not only to collapse the old dichotomy into a 
more fluid arrangement; the goal is ultimately to set up a robust ethical framework for CMC, 
which includes the demand that CMC not be reduced to a single class of objects with a single 
set of properties. The point is, again, that we do a disservice if we try to establish that any 
entity, practice or structure is inherently ethical. For this reason, a contingent 
phenomenological imperative is still in play as an adjunct to the ethical imperative: there is 
no single definition of CMC from which a complete ethics of CMC could be constituted, so 
we retain the need to engage in phenomenological inquiry into the differences between the 
various forms of CMC, and to investigate each use of CMC anew. It is useful, along such 
lines, to cling to something like the Levinasian “face” not just for the sake of distinguishing 
something like a face within CMC; rather, the Levinasian face is useful for the very reason 
that it asks us to always ask anew in each act of interlocution what it is that enjoins a user to 
respond in the manner of a “bringing forth” into language. A phenomenological imperative 
remains valid, in this sense, because even as CMC studies are becoming more open to the 
idea that CMC has its human face, so to speak, we do not wish to be drawn into another 
fallacious move by conflating a GUI representation of a face with the Levinasian face. The 
user is enjoined to respond within a CMC environment regardless of the absence of anything 
like a human face. As these latest studies in CMC are showing, perhaps, the GUI face may 
even represent a kind of obstacle to forming impressions of an interlocutor, which prompts us 
to ask if this also represents an obstacle to the formation of an ethical relation to the Other? 
There is clearly more work to be done in this direction. My point for now would be that we 
do not seek to determine in any universalising fashion a general principle of the effect of a 
GUI face on an ethical relation. Again, we seek to avoid declaring that something is 
inherently either ethical or unethical.  
In place of a principle of inherence, as noted above, an ethical ethics requires that we abide 
by a principle of adherence, a “sticky” ethics as it were. The phenomenological approach 
allows the investigator in each instance to determine the extent to which an object adheres to 
the fundamental requirements of an ethical relation as described in the Levinasian 
framework: a bringing forth of the subject into language as a response to at least one Other in 
a relation between two. The Levinasian face remains a useful concept at all times in such a 
project as a direction finder of sorts, always the answer to hand in response to the question 
presupposed by this statement of principle: toward what does the subject orient the response? 
It is of course a contingent answer, and that is precisely its point, to be contingent within a 
here-and-now of a relation. It is, in other words, purely relative. Investigations into an ethical 
framework for CMC bring this point to the surface with greater urgency, I suggest, because 
the field is at this very moment grappling with the question posed by the face. By this I do not 
mean that they are seeking the answer to the question posed by the face; rather, I suggest the 
latest researchers in CMC are only now coming to terms with what question it is that the face 
poses for them. As the old paradigm is overturned and the distinction between CMC and FTF 
collapses, researchers in the field face a new challenge: the challenge of the “face,” its 
realism, its uncanny valleys, and its protean nature. How will these researchers respond? 
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